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Lawsuits for medical malpractice are supposed to serve two pur-
poses: compensation of injured patients and deterrence of negligent
conduct by doctors and hospitals. However, those goals are not be-
ing served in the area of obstetric medicine. Malpractice liability
insurance premiums are increasing rapidly for obstetric care provid-
ers,' and as a result, delivery and perinatal care have become more
expensive and less available. At the same time, compensation is dis-
tributed inequitably. The liability crisis is more acute in obstetrics
than in any other medical specialty because the cost of compensat-
ing birth injury sufferers, who are disabled for their lifetimes, is very
high and has escalated rapidly.2
The situation could improve if an alternative compensation sys-
tem replaced malpractice lawsuits and insurance in the area of birth-
related injuries. Virginia and Florida recently enacted innovative
no-fault programs for compensating infants with birth-related inju-
ries, under which administrative agencies award compensation to in-
fants who suffer from one of a designated list of birth-related
injuries.3 In another proposed alternative, the physician or hospital
1. The term "provider" is used to refer to all individuals and institutions who pro-
vide obstetric care, including obstetricians, family practitioners, nurse-midwives, and
hospitals.
2. Obstetricians' malpractice insurance premiums have increased 171% from 1982
to 1986, as compared with only a 108% increase in general practitioners' malpractice
insurance premiums and a 14% increase in the Consumer Price Index in the same pe-
riod. C. Korenbrot, Effects of Professional Medical Liability Premiums on Obstetric
Providers and the Practice of Obstetrics (prepared for Institute of Medicine, Nat'l Acad-
emy of Sciences) (July 1988) at 2 & Table 1. See also American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, Premium Ranges of Professional Liability Insurance for Obstetri-
cians/Gynecologists in the United States, and Professional Liability Insurance Premium
Increases 1987 Over 1986 (Sept. 15, 1987).
3. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, 1987 Va. Acts 540,
codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (1987 Supp.) [hereinafter Va. Act]; Act
Relating to Medical Incidents, 1988 Fla. Laws Ch. 88-1 §§ 60-75 [hereinafter Fla. Act].
The Virginia and Florida statutes are identical in most respects, as the Florida Act cop-
ied the Virginia Act almost word for word.
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could offer the infant's family a guarantee of paying the full eco-
nomic costs of disability shortly after a birth-related injury; in ex-
change, the injured infant's family would not be allowed to sue for
malpractice. A third proposed system retains fault as the basis for
paying compensation but uses an administrative agency rather than
the courts to make the compensation decisions and to discipline
negligent or impaired doctors.4
Part I of this analysis describes the background of the.problem
and sets out some data highlighting the obstetric malpractice crisis.
Part II uses seven basic system components to describe the current
tort system and the three alternative systems for compensating peo-
ple with birth injuries: a system relying on providers' offers of eco-
nomic damages, an administrative fault-based system, and a no-fault
system. Part III evaluates and compares the four alternatives. Part
IV recommends a program combining the basic structure of the Vir-
ginia and Florida plans with the best features of the other programs:
experience-rated premiums, more dependable sources of financing,
an agency with disciplinary powers, incentives for providers to initi-
ate the process of compensation, and in-kind compensation to re-
duce moral hazard. Such a system will probably be superior to the
other alternatives in providing fair compensation and reducing inju-
ries and costs through a financially stable program. This analysis
focuses on birth injuries, but many of the problems addressed and
the policy approaches discussed could apply to medical malpractice
generally.
L Background of the Problem
Birth-related accidents, defined as iatrogenic injuries (caused by
medical treatment) to newborns connected with delivery, -" impose
high costs on affected infants, their families, and society. Hypoxia
(oxygen deprivation) and trauma (mechanical injury) to fetuses and
4. American Medical Association/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, A Pro-
posed Alternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A
Fault-Based, Administrative System 90-96 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter AMA, Fault-Based
Administrative System].
5. The clinical mistakes most commonly alleged to cause these accidents are failure
or delay in identification of fetal distress, delayed or improper performance of Caesarian
sections, improper choice of vaginal delivery instead of Caesarian section, and improp-
erly performed vaginal deliveries. These types of accidents cause brain damage which
results in retardation, cerebral palsy, hearing loss and impaired vision. Risk Manage-
ment Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions Inc., Fetal Monitoring Problems
During Labor Associated with Most Serious OB Claims, Forum, vol. 5, no. I (Jan./Feb.
1984) 1-2.
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newborns during or close to delivery can cause stillbirths and neo-
natal deaths; disabilities and malformities such as cerebral palsy,
mental retardation, nerve deficits, hearing and vision impairment,
and torticollis; and other less serious conditions such as cosmetic
injuries and fractured bones.'! Infants with birth injuries usually
need expensive, comprehensive medical care and often require life-
long care and assistance. 7 Retarded children with birth injuries usu-
ally require institutionalization by the age of seven, and often die
young (more than 50% within six years of institutionalization, and
74% by age 20).8 Recent advances in medical science that enable
physicians to save the lives of more endangered fetuses in risky de-
liveries also facilitate the survival of more infants with birth defects
or birth injuries. '
State benefits and private health insurance pay part of the high
costs of birth injuries, but much of the burden falls on the families
of the injured infants, who may sue their obstetric health care prov-
iders in order to have them assume part of the costs. The tort sys-
tem's primary purpose is to punish careless behavior and provide an
incentive to other providers to avoid accidents. Together with lia-
bility insurance, the malpractice tort system also functions to com-
pensate people who suffer injuries."'
The malpractice tort system has been identified with a crisis in the
field of obstetric care. I  As tort law provides some plaintiffs with
higher and higher damage awards, malpractice insurance carriers
have raised their premiums to obstetric care providers in order to
6. T. Barden, Perinatal Care, in Gynecology and Obstetrics: The Health Care of Wo-
men 595, 647-649 (2d ed. 1981).
7. The average cost of care for infants with mental retardation, cerebral palsy, and
epilepsy is $8,250 per year in California. Such infants-0.5% of all newborns in the
state within their first year of life-are eligible for comprehensive services and institu-
tionalization from the state. C. Korenbrot, C. Brindis &J. Becker, Cost Impact of Elimi-
nating Medi-Cal Paid Abortions (Institute for Health Policy Studies, Univ. of Calif., San
Francisco) 12-13 (June 1987). See D. Shepard, K. Pederson & C. Gallup, No-Fault Com-
pensation for Neurologically Impaired Infants: An Exploration of the Issues for the In-
surance Panel, Institute for Health Research, Harvard Community Health Plan 2-8 (Oct.
7, 1987) (describing services available for neurologically impaired children).
8. Chaney, Givens, Watkins & Eyman, Birth Injury as the Cause of Mental Retarda-
tion, 67 Obstetrics & Gynecology 771, 773 (1986).
9. Sokol, Editorial: Perinatal Risk and Cerebral Palsy, 251 J.A.M.A. 1868, 1869
(1984) (increase in cerebral palsy due to improved care and resultant decreased
mortality).
10. W. Schwartz & N. Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence: An Economic
View of Medical Malpractice (1978); C. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and
Economic Analysis (1970).
I1. Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74 Va. L.
Rev. 1487, 1495-96 nn. 43-45 (1988).
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cover their costs.' 2 In response, obstetricians have curtailed their
services and have raised their fees.'13 Poor women who are covered
by Medicaid or who are uninsured suffer the most as a con-
sequence. 14
II. Alternative Solutions
Systems for compensating sufferers of birth injuries, including the
current malpractice tort law and liability insurance system and pro-
posed alternatives, can be described and compared in terms of
seven basic components of the system that can be varied to alter the
system. These components, referred to as "design elements,"' 5 in-
clude (1) the compensable event; (2) the measure of compensation;
(3) the payment mechanism; (4) the forum for resolution of dis-
putes; (5) the method of implementation;'" (6) the initiation of the
process; and (7) the mechanism for deterring injuries. This Part
briefly explains each of the seven elements, and then uses them to
describe the alternative compensation systems that are evaluated. 1
7
12. Blair & Makar, The Structure of Florida's Medical Malpractice Insurance Market:
If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, 5 YaleJ. on. Reg. 427 (1988) (Florida malpractice insur-
ance crisis due to increasing damage awards, not insurance company collusion). See also
Nye, Gifford, Webb & Dewar, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis
of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 Geo. LJ. 1495 (1988) (economic
analysis of causes of the crisis).
13. In 1985, 12.3% of the physicians in the United States who were members of the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology reported that they had stopped practic-
ing obstetrics, 13.7% had reduced the number of deliveries performed, and 23.1% had
curtailed high-risk obstetric care; 82.9% had increased their fees because of the increas-
ing liability costs. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Professional Lia-
bility Insurance and Its Effect: Report of a Survey of ACOG's Membership (prepared by
Needham Porter Novelli, Inc.), Tables 28 & 29 (Nov. 1985). About 60% of the increases
in obstetricians' fees, and many other changes in obstetric practice, can be traced di-
rectly to the increasing costs of malpractice insurance. C. Korenbrot, supra note 2, at 15-
23.
14. Medicaid reimburses only 48% of obstetricians' usual fees for a complete obstet-
rical package in the U.S., and 36% of obstetricians refuse to treat Medicaid patients.
Mitchell & Schurman, Access to Private Obstetrics/Gynecology Services Under Medi-
caid, 22 Med. Care 1026-27, 1029 (1984). The malpractice crisis is compounding the
higher risks (due to other causes) of birth injuries faced by the offspring of poor women.
National Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality, Malpractice and Liability: An Obstet-
rical Crisis 9-10 (1988).
15. A. Meltsner & C. Bellavita, The Policy Organization 71 (1983).
16. Professor Abraham set out the first five of these design elements in his concep-
tual framework for medical liability reform. Abraham, Medical Liability Reform: A Con-
ceptual Framework, 260 J.A.M.A. 68, 72 (1988).
17. This discussion is summarized on Table 1, infra at p. 416.
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A. Design Elemenis for Defining Compensation Systems
The first design element is the decision rule that a system uses to
determine whether or not to award compensation. The traditional
decision rule in the tort system is fault.' 8 A second possible deci-
sion rule is cause: if the provider's conduct caused the injury, the
patient receives compensation, regardless of fault. 19 Birth injuries,
however, are often caused by multiple factors, and it is often difficult
to separate iatrogenic ailments from ailments due to underlying ill-
nesses or risk factors.2 0 The determination of whether the treat-
ment caused the injury could be as difficult and administratively
expensive as determining whether the provider was at fault. A simi-
lar but simpler decision rule, called a "designated compensable
event" system, compensates patients suffering an ailment that is on
a defined list of medical events that are more likely than not caused
by medical treatment.2 ' Finally, loss (regardless of fault or even
cause) is the decision rule used in private health insurance and in
government social insurance programs.92
The second design element is the measure of compensation paid
to the injury sufferer. Full tort damages generally include medical
expenses and lost wages together with damages for pain and suffer-
ing.2 3 Alternative measures are full economic damages, including
18. In a system based on fault, compensation is awarded if the provider's conduct
failed to conform to the customary medical standard of performance. Abraham, supra
note 16, at 68; AMA, Fault-Based Administrative System, supra note 4, at 90-96.
19. Cf Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (strict liability for selling dan-
gerously defective products).
20. Chaney, Givens, Watkins & Eyman, supra note 8 (many congenital malformities
misdiagnosed as birth injuries). The rapidly advancing technology in obstetrics compli-
cates the determination of whether an adverse event can be traced to a physician's fault,
or even whether a causal link can be traced to the physician's conduct. See Sokol, supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
21. Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach
to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 Milbank Memorial Fund Q Health &
Soc'y 125 (1973); Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?,
1975 Duke L.J. 1233 [hereinafter Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"]. Creating
such a list may be easier said than done. See P. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory,
Evidence, and Public Policy 217 (1985); Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and
Cure, in The Economics of Medical Malpractice (S. Rottenberg ed.) 245, 260-64 (1978).
For an attempt to create such a list for certain specialties, see American Bar Association
Commission on Medical Professional Liability, Designated Compensable Event System:
A Feasibility Study (1979).
22. Abraham, supra note 16, at 69.
23. Pain and suffering damages are often the largest component of damage awards
by juries. See G. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 215-25.
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actual out-of-pocket expenses but not damages for pain and suffer-
ing; or partial economic losses, reducing the compensation with de-
ductibles, co-payment requirements, and other provisions.2 4 Any
one of these measures of compensation may be reduced to take ac-
count of collateral sources of compensation, such as health insur-
ance or governmental benefits; if so, the collateral source providers
may have a right of subrogation (recovery from the party responsi-
ble for paying compensation). The timing of compensation can also
vary: compensation can be paid in a lump sum or periodically over a
time period.
The measure of compensation is particularly difficult to assess
with injured infants. It is impossible to estimate their lifetime lost
earning power, because of the impossibility of knowing what occu-
pation they would have had absent the injury and how long they
would have lived. Furthermore, because it is difficult to distinguish
between ailments caused by medical treatment and those caused by
congenital factors, it is difficult to compute compensation based on
the difference between infants' potential given the iatrogenic injury
and their potential without the injury. These difficulties can be side-
stepped by using a fixed schedule to determine compensation for
specified losses, 25 or can be avoided by providing in-kind compensa-
tion, such as comprehensive services through a state agency.
The third design element is the payment mechanism, which de-
pends on which parties are responsible for paying the compensation
and what mechanisms they use to pool their risks. The current mal-
practice system uses third-party insurance in which providers are re-
sponsible for paying compensation and pool their risks through
insurance. Holding providers responsible creates an incentive to
avoid risky behavior, but third-party insurance dilutes this deterrent
effect by spreading the risk of payment. 2 1 Other approaches include
first-party insurance, such as health insurance, which enables pa-
tients who are responsible for paying for their own injuries to
spread their risks; and government compensation funds, which
24. These provisions, frequently used by insurance systems, "are a means of limiting
costs and creating incentives against overconsumption of benefits such as insured medi-
cal care." Abraham, supra note 16, at 69; K. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance,
Legal Theory, and Public Policy 1-7 (1986).
25. Cf Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (upholding use of schedule to de-
termine Social Security disability benefits).
26. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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could pay full compensation and be supported through assessments
on providers, insurers, patients, or the taxpayers at large.2 7
The fourth design element is the forum for resolving disputes, the
institution that makes the decision about whether to compensate in
any given case. Courts make these decisions in the tort system.
Judges decide matters of law and juries generally decide matters of
fact. Although over 90% of cases are ultimately settled out of
court,'2  those settlements are based on the perceived likelihood that
courts will award compensation at trial .2 1 Alternative institutions
could be made responsible for decision-making: expert review
panels (used alone or in combination with another decision-making
body), binding arbitration, or a specialized administrative agency.
In a simple first-party insurance system that uses loss or cause as the
decision rule, insurance companies could resolve most disputes,
with courts adjudicating contested denials of coverage.3 0
The fifth design element is the method of implementation. Prov-
iders and patients can contract in advance of treatment for an alter-
native system.3' However, the legality of pre-treatment contracts
waiving tort rights and providing for alternative systems is un-
clear-.3 2 In particular, it is probably not possible to waive the right of
unborn fetuses in advance of their birth.33 The only other way to
implement an alternative system is through legislation; such legisla-
tion could provide for an alternative mandatory system, or for an
optional system. An optional system would have to determine a
27. Current government programs supporting some services for disabled children
and adults constitute partial compensation. A government fund providing full compen-
sation would be similar to social health insurance programs widely used in other coun-
tries. Another way to finance the program would be to raise revenues from increased
taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, which would be more acceptable than funding from
general revenues in most states.
28. P. Danzon, supra note 21, at 31.
29. Settlements also factor in the high administrative cost of trials. W. Schwartz &
N. Komesar, spra note 10, at 13.
30. Abraham, supra note 16, at 71.
31. Professor Richard Epstein has suggested that malpractice should be a matter
exclusively for contract law rather than tort law, as parties could agree in advance about
how medical maloccurrences will be treated. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for
Contract, 76 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 87 (1976). This proposal has been criticized as un-
workable, since physicians and patients have unequal knowledge of risks. P. Danzon,
supra note 21, at 209-11; Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice: Trying to Round Out
the Circle, in The Economics of Medical Malpractice (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978) 233, 234-
35.
32. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963) (invalidating pretreatment contract waiving malpractice suit against hos-
pital as an adhesion contract of exculpation).
33. But see Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The
Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1451, 1457-59 (1988) (arguing that




background system in the event the option is not exercised; who
could exercise the option (providers, patients, or both); and when
the option could be chosen.3 4 A third implementation method is
not to implement any reforms and to retain the current system.
The sixth design element is the initiation of the process. Most
systems presume that the representatives of injured infants initiate
the process by bringing a claim against the provider. To do so, the
representatives must identify the ailment as a birth-related injury
and must find an attorney to represent them.3 5 Alternatively, a sys-
tem could create incentives for providers, who have more informa-
tion, to initiate the compensation process; or some neutral third
party, such as a government enforcement agency, could initiate the
process.
The seventh design element is the mechanism the system uses to
deter injury. One way the system could deter injurious conduct is
by compelling providers who cause injuries to compensate the in-
jured, creating a financial incentive to avoid injuries. However, risk-
spreading liability insurance dilutes this deterrent signal. Insurers
currently base medical malpractice insurance premiums solely on
geographical location and nature of practice,3"i but premiums could
be "experience-rated"--that is, set based on providers' past loss ex-
perience, which is a good predictor of future risk.- 7 As an alterna-
tive mechanism for deterring carelessness or misconduct, a
disciplinary board could investigate and sanction physicians who
34. Voluntary programs enable several systems to operate in tandem, which reduces
the-risk of "massive regulatory blunder." Epstein, supra note 21, at 260, 267. On the
other hand, in a voluntary environment, high-risk individuals would opt for the system
that provides greater coverage or coverage at a lower cost; this process, known as ad-
verse selection, would threaten the system's financial stability. See K. Abraham, supra
note 24, at 15.
35. Lay people are often unable to detect injuries, to know that they are compensa-
ble, or to procure legal representation. E. Roth & P. Rosenthal, Non-Fault Based Medi-
cal Injury Compensation Systems, in U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare,
Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (DHEW Pub. Nos.
(OS)73-88 & (OS) 73-89), App. at 450, 455 (1973). Injured persons bring claims for
only one out of every six incidents of hospital malpractice, and 40% of the incidents in
insurance companies' files were reported by providers but never pursued by injured
patients. P. Danzon, supra note 21, at 29. Injured persons may bring claims for as few as
one out of every 15 incidents of malpractice. W. Schwartz & N. Komesar, supra note 10,
at 11; L. Pocincki, S. Dogger & B. Schwartz, The Incidence of latrogenic Injuries, in U.S.
Department of Health, Education & Welfare, App. at 50.
36. W. Schwartz & N. Komesar, supra note 10, at 14.
37. Experience rating decreases the amount of risk pooling, but improves the deter-
rent effect of a compensation system. Id. at 15-16. See also Havighurst & Tancredi,
supra note 21, at 129-30. For the definition of experience rating, see K. Abraham, supra
note 24, at 72.
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cause injuries. 3 8 Sanctions could include revoking or restricting the
physician's license to practice medicine.
B. Economic Damage Offer Proposal
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has proposed an "economic damage
guarantee ' 39 program that would give physicians and other poten-
tial defendants an incentive to pay compensation voluntarily to in-
jured persons. 40 Under O'Connell's proposed system, an injured
infant's representatives would not be allowed to bring suit if the
physician or hospital offered to pay full compensation for all eco-
nomic losses promptly after the accident.
The most innovative aspect of O'Connell's proposal is that the
provider's offer, rather than the injured's claim, would initiate the
process. The decision rule is similar to that in the current system:
"providers will make tenders only in those cases in which their con-
duct has been most faulty and in which it is most likely that a tort
action would result in a large judgment, and conversely, they will
not make a tender in the marginal cases in which they do not per-
ceive a substantial risk of liability.4 ' Therefore, the likely compensa-
tion in the tort system provides a ceiling amount that would be the
basis of the provider's decision whether to make an offer.
If the provider opted to make an offer, the measure of compensa-
tion would be full economic losses as incurred, including past and
future medical costs, lost wages, and attorney's fees. However, the
infant and family would lose the right to sue and the possibility of
large pain and suffering damages, except in the case of intentional
misconduct. As in the tort system, third-party insurance would be
the payment mechanism.
38. Most states have such boards, but their disciplinary sanctions are generally not
enforced strongly. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, Medical Malpractice: The
Need for Disciplinary Reform, Not Tort Reform (1985) (arguing for stronger sanctions).
39. This appellation was coined in United States Department of Health & Human
Services, Report of the Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice 45 (1987).
40. See, e.g., O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-
Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 501 (1976); O'Connell,
Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants'
Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 589 (1982);
Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Eco-
nomic Loss, 44 La. L. Rev. 1267 (1984); O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu
of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 898
(1985) [hereinafter O'Connell, "Neo No-Fault"I.
41. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 40, at 1283. Thus, if the plaintiff is likely to
prevail and receive a damage award larger than the amount of an economic damage
offer, the provider would make an offer. If it is uncertain whether the plaintiff would
prevail or if the likely damage award is small, the provider will not make an offer and will




The parties themselves would settle cases in most instances, ex-
cept in the event that providers failed to make prompt offers, in
which case the patients would have recourse to sue in tort. This
reform could be put into place either through an enabling statute42
or through a contract made between the provider and the patient
before the delivery begins. 43 It would be voluntary for the physician
or hospital, but compulsory for the infant and family. If a prompt
offer were made, they would be foreclosed from bringing a lawsuit.
C. Administrative Fault-Based System
The American Medical Association (AMA) and 31 national medi-
cal specialty societies, including the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG), have proposed that a state
administrative agency have power both to resolve medical liability
disputes and to discipline doctors. 44  This innovative proposal
would create an administrative agency as the central decision mak-
ing and dispute resolving institution. 45
The plan would retain negligence as the principle for decisions , 4 6
but because all the decisions would be rendered by a single, special-
ized agency rather than by multiple juries and judges, the standards
expected of physicians could become more consistent from case to
case, and consequently more rational and predictable for providers.
Injured claimants would receive economic damages based on sched-
ules promulgated by the agency's board, plus such non-economic
damages (up to a determined maximum) as the hearing examiner
42. Legislators in the U.S. Congress and in the Massachusetts legislature have intro-
duced similar plans, but the bills were not enacted. Alternative Medical Liability Act,
H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Medical Offer and Recovery Act, H.R. 3084,
99th Cong, 1st Sess. (1985); Mass. H.B. 6829, 1985 Sess. § 34. See O'Connell, Prag-
matic Constraints on Market Approaches: A Response to Professor Epstein, 74 Va. L.
Rev. 1475, 1477 & nn. 9-11 (1988).
43. O'Connell, "Neo No-Fault," supra note 40. However, since the unborn infant
cannot agree to a contract limiting her right to sue before delivery, the contractual op-
tion may not be available for birth injuries as it might for other types of malpractice. See
Epstein, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
44. AMA, Fault-Based Administrative System, supra note 4, at 17.
45. The plan provides for detailed administrative procedures. An injured patient
would bring a claim to the agency, which could provide a lawyer to represent the claim-
ant. Peer review and settlement conference procedures would eliminate frivolous claims
and would strongly encourage the parties to reach settlements. For cases that were not
settled, hearing examiners (administrative law judges) could render decisions based on
documentary evidence, or could conduct hearings. Parties could appeal adverse deci-
sions to the agency's board, which would both adjudicate claims and develop rules and
standards of care. Judicial review in the state appellate courts would be available.
46. The AMA/Specialty Society report proposes many changes in the legal stan-
dards, but these amount to fine tuning rather than systematic change. AMA, Fault-
Based Administrative System, supra note 4, at 82-160.
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found appropriate. The payment mechanism would be third-party
insurance.
This system would deter injury both through the existing com-
pensation incentive of the tort system, and also through direct disci-
plinary powers of the agency. The Board would collect information
on physician performance from its own proceedings, peers, hospi-
tals, credentialing organizations, and insurance companies, and
would have extensive powers to restrict or revoke physicians'
licenses and to refer physicians to drug or alcohol treatment
programs. 47
D. No-Fault Compensation Program
Professor Albert Ehrenzweig first proposed a no-fault system,
which he called "hospital-accident insurance," in 1964.48 More re-
cently, Professors Clark Havighurst and Laurence Tancredi put for-
ward a detailed proposal for no-fault "medical adversity
insurance.'4' Such a system could easily be tailored for injuries
within one medical specialty, such as obstetrics.511 The legislatures
of Virginia and Florida both recently adopted similar compensation
programs specifically for compensating birth injuries. 5' This sec-
tion describes the no-fault programs proposed by Havighurst and
Tancredi and the programs adopted by Virginia and Florida in
terms of the design elements.
1. Decision rule. Havighurst and Tancredi proposed a no-fault
system based on designated compensable events (DCE). Ailments
not designated as compensable would not be compensated through
this system, but patients would have recourse to a personal injury
lawsuit to allege fault. The definition of which events would be des-
ignated as compensable determines the number of payable claims.
47. Strong discipline by a medical board may be the best way to deter medical mal-
practice. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, supra note 38.
48. Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step
Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279
(1964).
49. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 2 1; Havighurst, supra note 21; Tancredi, De-
signing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 277 (Spring 1986).
50. The American Bar Association sponsored a detailed feasibility study of such a
system for surgery and orthopedics, for which a group of experts determined a list of
compensable events and costs were estimated. American Bar Association Commission
on Medical Professional Liability, supra note 21.
51. Va. Act, supra note 3; Fla. Act, supra note 3. For a general commentary and anal-
ysis of the Virginia program, see Note, supra note 11 (explaining plan in detail, analyzing
its constitutionality, and suggesting amendments to statute); see also Epstein, supra note




A broad definition would be desirable to compensate more injuries,
but could make the program overly costly. Too narrow a definition
would make the plan more feasible financially, but could overly limit
compensation and leave too many cases to the tort liability system,
so that the plan would only marginally affect the problems it is
designed to solve.
Both the Virginia and the Florida programs employ a decision
rule defining the compensable event as "injury to the brain or spinal
cord of an infant" which is caused by "the deprivation of oxygen or
mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or re-
suscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospi-
tal. .. -52 Under both programs, the no-fault compensation system
is the exclusive remedy for infants with compensable injuries and
their families; they are barred from suing their providers or
hospitals.
2. Measure of compensation. Havighurst and Tancredi pro-
posed providing full economic damages, plus the possible addition
of a scheduled amount of pain and suffering damages (especially for
people with permanent afflictions). 53 They proposed enabling col-
lateral source providers to be compensated under the plan for
amounts paid out.5 4 Payment of compensation regardless of collat-
eral benefits (the traditional tort damages rule) or with a right of
subrogation to the collateral sources (Havighurst and Tancredi's
proposal) communicates the cost signal more efficiently to provid-
ers, as potential injurers. However, excluding collateral benefits
spreads risks more broadly and makes the programs more feasible
financially.
Virginia and Florida compensate injured infants for all reasonable
expenses for hospital costs, other medical costs, rehabilitation, insti-
tutionalization, and other treatment costs, reduced by benefits re-
ceived from collateral sources.55  Neither state specifically
52. Va. Act, supra note 3, § 38.2-5001, para. 1; Fla. Act, supra note 3, § 61(2). The
most significant difference between the two programs is that Virginia restricts coverage
to injury "which renders the infant permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent,
and in need of assistance in all phases of daily living," thus limiting coverage to babies
whose injuries are so severe that many could be expected to die within a short time.
Florida substitutes a broader definition of the injury, "which renders the infant perma-
nently and substantially mentally and physically impaired," but covers only infants born
"of term gestation" (infants who are not premature), thus excluding the most risky
births. Both states exclude stillbirths.
53. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 21, at 128-29.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Florida further specifies that medically necessary drugs, equipment, and special
transportation should be covered, as well as home care costs in lieu of institutionaliza-
tion. Virginia compensates for lost wages based on a conclusive presumption of lifetime
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compensates for the lost enjoyment of life or for pain and suffering,
but Florida allows a non-economic damage award of up to $100,000
to the infant's parents or legal guardians. Both states reduce the
compensation by the amount received from collateral sources (such
as Medicaid, other government benefits and first-party health insur-
ance benefits). Both states pay compensation periodically, rather
than in a lump sum, because the compensation is likely to be a large
amount over the injured person's lifetime, and particularly because
it is difficult to project the expected length of the lifetime, since
many victims of birth injuries have tragically short lives.
3. Payment mechanism. Havighurst and Tancredi proposed
that providers buy "Medical Adversity Insurance"; thus, just as in
the tort system, providers would be held liable individually but
would pool their risks through insurance. However, Havighurst and
Tancredi also proposed experience-rated premiums for such insur-
ance to improve the system's deterrent effect. Providers would have
to buy both ordinary malpractice liability insurance and special no-
fault insurance to compensate patients under this system.
Virginia and Florida created new state agencies to control the
funds that pay claims and collect premiums. 56 These agencies ap-
pear before the workers' compensation agencies as a respondent
and defend against claims. The agencies may participate in the rein-
surance markets to cover their risk exposure, just as private insurers
do. Participating obstetricians pay $5,000 per year into the fund,
and participating hospitals pay annual assessments of $50 per deliv-
ery performed the previous year.57 There is no provision for experi-
ence-rating premiums. Non-participating doctors of all specialties
are required to contribute $250 per year, and if additional funding
is required, casualty insurers in the state will be assessed a surcharge
of a proportion of their annual net direct premiums.
58
earning power (half the state's average private, non-farm wage over a working life from
ages 18 to 65); Florida does not cover wages at all. Va. Act, supra note 3, § 38.2-5009;
Fla. Act, supra note 3, § 69.
56. The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Fund is created in
Va. Act, supra note 3, § 38.2-5015, and the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Association is created in Fla. Act, supra note 3, § 74.
57. Va. Act, supra note 3, § 38.2-5019. In Florida, the Act requires participation
from all non-governmental hospitals in the state. Fla. Act, supra note 3, § 73(4). For a
tabular summary of the financing mechanisms of the two programs, see Table 2, infra
text accompanying note 93. Epstein notes that "the fees charged do not begin to ap-
proximate the risks that are covered," and predicts severe market distortions as a result.
Epstein, supra note 33, at 1471, 1470-73.
58. In both Virginia and Florida, insurers may be assessed based on up to 1/4 of one
percent of their net direct premiums. Va. Act, supra note 3, § 38.2-5020(B)(2); Fla. Act,
supra note 3, § 73(5)(c)(3). Although Virginia set the amounts of the assessments rather




A no-fault program entails unknown and possibly very high costs.
A critical question is who should bear the risk of unfunded liabilities
or a default of the fund. In Virginia and Florida, state government
agencies administer the funds, and therefore the states appear to
assume the risk.59 Other possible candidates could include the
providers and hospitals, or their associations; the liability insurance
carriers, who could be assessed for unfunded liabilities (this would
ultimately cost other activities insured by those carriers, or would be
borne by the carriers' shareholders); or the injured patients and
their families-the plan could simply terminate periodic payments
to them if funds were insufficient. This issue is difficult to resolve
and could be politically explosive.
4. Forum for resolving disputes. Havighurst and Tancredi pro-
posed a compensation scheme that "would be roughly analogous to
the workmen's compensation system,"' 0 but did not detail how it
would operate. They implied that private insurance companies
would pay claims and that courts would continue to make decisions
in the event of disputes between claimants and insurers.
Both Virginia and Florida make use of their existing workers'
compensation agencies, to which claimants bring claims and which
have the authority to determine whether claims fall within the statu-
tory definition and to award compensation to claimants.!" Thus, the
programs take advantage of the expertise of the workers' compensa-
tion agencies in handling similar claims, and save on the costs of
setting up a new agency. A claim to the agency is the exclusive rem-
edy for infants with compensable injuries and their families; they are
barred from suing their providers or hospitals.
5. Method of implementation. Ehrenzweig, Havighurst and Tan-
credi envisioned a compulsory no-fault system enacted by the state
legislature.62 The Virginia and Florida programs, enacted by stat-
ute, allow doctors and hospitals to choose whether or not to partici-
pate in the program. If they participate, they are immune from suit
HB1216, 114 Va. Medical 284 (May 1987) (account of political battle to enact Virginia
law), Florida appears simply to have adopted these amounts from the Virginia Act even
though they may be insufficient. See Table 2, infra text accompanying note 93.
59. Florida explicitly waives the state's sovereign immunity, Fla. Act, supra note 3,
§ 62(3), so the state can be sued to pay compensation claims.
60. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 21, at 128.
61. Va. Act, supra note 3, § 38.2-5003; Fla. Act, supra note 3, § 63.
62. Ehrenzweig, supra note 48; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 21, at 128. Havig-
burst and Tancredi have proposed creating such a system by contract rather than by
legislation. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and
Legal Obstacles, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 143 (Spring 1986); Tancredi, supra note 49.
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for compensable injuries; if they opt not to participate, they are lia-
ble in tort for all injuries. For patients, however, the program is
compulsory. If a participating physician delivered the baby in a par-
ticipating hospital, an injured infant's representatives must bring
claims in the no-fault system and may not sue. If the provider was
not a participant, the injured infant may sue, but may not bring a
no-fault claim.
The only way for a patient to avoid the compulsory system is to
choose a doctor who is not participating. Expectant mothers would
have the option of choosing obstetricians with no-fault malpractice
coverage or providers against whom conventional tort suits could be
brought. The Florida statute requires that participating providers
and hospitals inform patients about the plan and explain it to them.
The Virginia statute will probably be amended soon to include such
a requirement. 63 However, expectant mothers are likely not to
choose providers on the basis of such information. They are likely
to remain relatively unenlightened, and possibly unable to make ra-
tional decisions about risk.64
6. Initiation of the process. Both the Havighurst and Tancredi
proposal and the Virginia and Florida statutes contemplate that the
injured infant's representatives initiate the process by presenting a
claim.
7. Deterrence mechanism. Havighurst and Tancredi proposed
structuring the no-fault insurance system with a strict system of "ex-
perience-rating," under which providers and hospitals with a higher
experience of compensable events would pay higher premiums. Ex-
perience-rating would penalize more risky providers, and would
probably deter injurious conduct more effectively than the tort sys-
tem." 5 Virginia and Florida do not provide for experience-rating
premiums, and contain no other mechanism for deterring injuries.
III. Assessment of the Alternatives
The tort system and the alternative systems for compensating
birth injuries can be compared and assessed in terms of three crite-
ria: fair compensation, reduction of injuries and costs, and financial
However, as noted above, providers may not be able to bind an unborn fetus with a pre-
treatment contract. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
63. Telephone interview with Sandra L. Kramer, attorney, Medical Society of Vir-
ginia, Richmond (Feb. 26, 1988).
64. W. Schwartz & N. Komesar, supra note 10, at 18.
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feasibility. 66 First, systems should compensate people injured in
birth-related accidents fully and promptly. The decisions and
awards of compensation should be consistent and predictable from
case to case. The system should ensure that the compensation fully
covers costs over the course of disability.
6 7
Second, systems should minimize the sum of the costs of acci-
dents, the cost of avoiding them, and the cost of administering the
system.68 A system should provide incentives to reduce the number
and severity of birth-related injuries. Proposals should reduce the
cost of avoiding accidents by discouraging wasteful, defensive medi-
cal practices undertaken solely to avoid liability. Also, administra-
tive costs should be as low as possible.
Third, to be financially feasible, proposals must raise enough rev-
enue to cover the costs they entail. In systems which are alternatives
to the status quo, insurance funds should be "in balance"-that is,
the savings generated by limitations on damage awards should be
equal to or greater than any increase in benefits paid, so that the
system can pay for itself and be stable.6'3
The tort system and the alternative systems for compensating
people with birth injuries can be compared and assessed in terms of
these criteria. 70 There are trade-offs among criteria, and not all of
them can be maximized at the same time. For example, too much
compensation for birth injuries would threaten a system's financial
feasibility. Nonetheless, it is possible to reach conclusions about the
overall value of different systems.
A. Evaluation of the Status Quo
The tort system does not function well either in deterring mal-
practice or in compensating injured patients. First, the tort system
compensates people unfairly, because the awards to injured
newborns are erratic, unpredictable, and inconsistent. 7' Lay juries
66. Cf G. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 24-33 (proposing similar criteria for evaluating
different systems).
67. E. Roth & P. Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 461-63.
68. G. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 26-31.
69. U.S. Department of Transportation, Compensating Auto Accident Victims: A
Follow-up Report on No-Fault Auto Insurance Experiences (DOT-P-30-84-20) 3, 16
(May 1985) (defining "balance" for no-fault auto insurance).
70. Ideally, a comparative institutional analysis of different risk management systems
would consider the interaction of different systems operating simultaneously. See Vis-
cusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regu-
lation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YaleJ. on Reg. 65 (1989).
71. Some injured patients do not get compensated, while others receive large wind-




with no expertise in deciding malpractice claims decide the facts of
each case as the first and last case they ever see, often basing their
decisions in large part on emotion rather than decision rules. 72
Long delays occur between suffering injury and receiving compen-
sation, forcing families to bear the costs in the meanwhile. 73 Many
families find it difficult to initiate claims;74 in fact, one study found
that only one tenth of those with injuries due to medical negligence
ever bring a claim at all. 75
The tort system is not effective in reducing the costs of birth acci-
dents. Malpractice insurance insulates providers from damage
awards and shields them from the economic incentive provided by
damages. "[N]o individual physician has more than a slight pecuni-
ary incentive to reduce the expected losses resulting from his own
behavior."' 7" Furthermore, the diffused, case-by-case decision pro-
cess involving inexperienced judges and juries yields decisions that
are inconsistent to the point of randomness and does not consider
the effects on medical practice as a whole. As a result, providers do
not receive clear signals about what constitutes careless or inade-
quate care and are unable to adjust their conduct accordingly. 77
Defensive medicine associated with the tort system is essentially a
high cost of avoiding accidents. Providers are more likely to be pe-
nalized for ordering too few tests or for failing to perform Caesarian
sections, but not for ordering too many tests or for performing un-
necessary Caesarian sections. Consequently, providers have incen-
tives to perform procedures that are not medically justified in order
to give the impression of reducing risk and to make a liability judg-
ment less likely.78 However, Professor Danzon points out that many
of these problems are traceable to distortions from fee-for-service
health insurance, rather than malpractice lawsuits.7
Insurance," supra note 21, at 1234-35. See generally J. O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery:
Only the Lawyers Win (1979).
72. J. O'Connell & C.B. Kelly, The Blame Game: Injuries, Insurance, and Injustice
24-32 (1987); O'Connell, "Neo No-Fault," supra note 40, at 899-900.
73. The average time from accidents to disposition of claims was 41 months for paid
claims and 32 months for unpaid claims, with an overall average of 36 months. P.
Danzon, supra note 21, at 193.
74. See supra note 35.
75. P. Danzon, supra note 21, at 29.
76. W. Schwartz & N. Komesar, supra note 10, at 14.
77. AMA, Fault-Based Administrative System, supra note 4, at 8-9, 90-96.
78. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance," supra note 21, at 1235; E.
Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare,
supra note 35, App. at 38; C. Korenbrot, supra note 2, at 19-21.
79. P. Danzon, supra note 2 1, at 149-50. Physicians do respond to the signals of the
tort system, and many of the additional procedures may be beneficial, so it is "difficult to
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The main problem with the malpractice tort system is that it en-
genders enormous administrative costs. Of every dollar paid in mal-
practice insurance premiums, only 30% to 40% is received by
injured patients in compensation for injuries; in other words, 66
cents out of every dollar recovered by plaintiffs is consumed by at-
torneys' and expert witnesses' fees and court costs."" Litigation is
tremendously time-consuming. Those plaintiffs who prevail experi-
ence average delays of three years between occurrence of their inju-
ries and receipt of their awards."' Trials also impose costs of time
and emotional stress on providers and the injured infants' families
which cannot be quantified.
The crisis in malpractice insurance reveals a financially unbal-
anced liability insurance system .812 The possibility of large damage
awards is driving up premiums at a rapid rate,8 3 causing a crisis in
the availability of obstetric care.
B. Evaluation of the Economic Damage Offer Proposal
Any alternative to the tort system that reduces the size of dispro-
portionately large damage awards but increases the number of paid
claims would lead to fairer compensation at no additional cost. The
economic damage offer proposal would distribute compensation
more equitably, as everyone compensated would receive the same
measure of economic damages rather than some receiving huge
awards and others receiving small or no awards. Providers would
initiate the process, and since they have more information about
which injuries can be compensated and about how the system works,
the economic damage offer system would probably reach more in-
fants. However, because the likely damage award in tort would
serve as the baseline that would determine whether providers make
offers, the aggregate amount of compensation to injured infants
would probably be lower, and the number of injured infants who
would receive compensation still would not increase significantly.
draw the line between where good medicine stops and defensive practice begins." Id. at
146.
80. Id. at 186-87.
81. Id. at 193.
82. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
83. Insurance is costly in part because the risk of liability for obstetric malpractice
has a "long tail": claims for injuries during a certain period may be presented years
later. "Claims-made" policies (covering only those accidents for which claims are actu-
ally presented during the period) merely shift the cost and uncertainty of those latent




The economic damage offer proposal would deter injurious con-
duct less successfully than the tort system. The liability insurance
system would shield providers from the deterrent signal in the eco-
nomic damage offer system in the same way as it does in the tort
system. Because of the decreased likelihood of large damage
awards and the reduced aggregate amount of compensation, the
system's deterrent effect would probably be weaker than that of the
tort system, leading ultimately to more birth injuries.
Providers would feel less pressure to practice unnecessary defen-
sive medicine to avoid the appearance of liability under the eco-
nomic damage offer system, because they would make offers only in
cases of real malpractice.8 4 By reducing the amount of litigation,
this plan would reduce administrative costs below those of the cur-
rent litigation-based system. However, due to moral hazard, the
plan may entail added costs.8 5 The commitment to pay all costs of
treating injured infants as they are incurred would give the families
or caretakers of those infants an incentive to spend without limit,
knowing all costs would be covered. Thus, the full compensation of
economic costs could turn out to be costlier than expected.8 "6 It is
difficult to estimate how these factors balance and to assess whether
the economic damage offer system would be more or less costly than
the tort system.
The economic damage offer plan would eliminate unpredictably
large damage awards for "pain and suffering" or for noneconomic
damages. Malpractice insurers could make more confident predic-
tions of their total payouts, and amounts paid out would be equal to
or less than those in the tort system. Ultimately, the malpractice
liability insurance system would be more stable under this proposal
than under the current system.
C. Evaluation of the Administrative Fault-Based System
The administrative fault-based system would provide fairer com-
pensation than either torts or the economic damage offer plan. The
agency would award more consistent amounts of compensation to
infants with comparable injuries. The decision process would be
84. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 40, at 1285-87.
85. Insurance systems create a perverse incentive, called "moral hazard," for people
who are insured against a risk to engage in conduct that increases the risks of that occur-
rence or for people who are covered to make greater claims. Like the closely related
phenomenon of adverse selection, see supra note 34, moral hazard raises the costs and
threatens the financial balance of insurance systems. See K. Abraham, supra note 24, at
14-16.
86. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 40, at 1283.
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more rational than either the tort system or the economic damage
offer proposal, which is based largely on the tort system.
The program would achieve a. vast improvement over the current
system in deterring the misconduct that causes medical injuries,
since the same authority that would administer claims would also
have power to discipline physicians in more substantial, non-finan-
cial ways. Also, if the determinations were more accurate than
under tort law, then the deterrent signals would be transmitted
more accurately.
This system would reduce the costs of avoiding accidents. It
would be more accurate than judicial determinations and would
eliminate the needless procedures that make it less likely for courts
to determine that a provider has been negligent. Providers would
also have more incentive to practice the kind of "defensive"
medicine that actually reduces risks, since determinations would be
made by reference to a more clearly and rationally defined standard
of care.
The costs of setting up the new administrative agency (or the cost
of reconstituting an existing agency such as a worker's compensa-
tion board or board of medical quality assurance) and the claims
processing procedures initially would entail considerable costs. In
the long run, these costs would probably be less than the enormous
costs of litigation. The system provides roughly the same incentive
to settle as the tort system. Thus, the administrative costs of this
plan would be less than those of the tort system, but might exceed
those of the economic damage offer plan, which relies primarily on
settlements between the parties.
The system would result in a greater number of claimants receiv-
ing smaller amounts, and the decisions and settlements would be
more attuned to the actual level of risky behavior. The amounts
would be more rational and predictable, reducing liability insurance
costs. Therefore, the malpractice liability insurance system would
be more "in balance" than the tort system, but it is difficult to pre-
dict how the system's financial feasibility would compare with that of
the economic damage offer proposal.
D. Evaluation of the No-Fault Compensation Program
A no-fault plan probably would compensate injured infants more
fairly and promptly than any of the other alternatives. 7 Fault-based
87. Although the plans compensate victims equitably, the funding mechanism is not




systems compensate infants suffering injuries due to negligence but
not those whose injuries are not due to negligence. This system
would eliminate that arbitrary distinction, and would compensate all
infants with injuries that fall within the prescribed definition. The
plan would be consistent as all infants and families facing similar
costs would receive similar amounts of compensation. However, the
plan would leave to the traditional tort system those infants with
injuries that fall outside the compensable definition. The distinc-
tion between the types of injuries defined as compensable and non-
compensable may be as arbitrary a way of deciding who receives
compensation as the negligence standard.
Because it would be relatively easier to determine whether or not
a case falls within the compensable definition than whether or not a
provider was at fault, the compensation would be made much more
quickly than in any of the fault-based systems. Avoiding determina-
tion of fault will eliminate much of the cost of litigation. However,
litigation would continue, not over the issue of negligence but over
the issue of whether the injury fell within the compensable defini-
tion. Families with injured infants who could receive huge damage
awards in tort litigation but would receive only modest compensa-
tion in the no-fault system will claim that injuries fall outside the
definition; families with injured infants who could be compensated
under the no-fault plan but might not be likely to prevail in tort
litigation will claim that their injuries are within the definition of
compensable injuries. Litigation over these "boundary" cases will
probably ensue. 88
One of the greatest drawbacks of the Virginia and Florida no-fault
plans is that neither contains any mechanism for deterring birth ac-
cidents. Both plans remove birth accidents from the tort system,
thus eliminating the (admittedly weak) deterrent signal provided by
the possibility of liability for malpractice. Havighurst and Tancredi
proposed a no-fault system with experience-rated premiums, which
would provide an effective deterrent.'1
The greatest area of uncertainty over a no-fault system is whether
it can be financially stable. It is still unknown how the Virginia and
88. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 1470. See generally Henderson, The Boundary
Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 Md. L. Rev. 659 (1982). Similar boundary litigation
over "verbal thresholds" in auto accident no-fault systems subsided after a few years in
most no-fault jurisdictions as courts clarified the standards. U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, supra note 69, at 100-104. However, in the birth injury area, technology and
medical understanding are constantly changing, so such boundary litigation might not
subside.
89. See snpra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Florida plans are working.')° The Virginia statute went into effect on
January 1, 1988, and the Florida statute went into effect on January
1, 1989. Therefore, there is no working experience to evaluate
these plans.''
The legislatures of Virginia and Florida passed the programs de-
spite the likelihood that neither plan will be financially self-support-
ing as enacted (although they could be if funding assessment levels
were increased). Table 2 shows the cost estimates that were
presented to the legislatures while they were considering the legisla-
tion. The number of claims per year in the Florida cost estimate
(and presumably also in the Virginia estimate) was based on the
number of malpractice liability claims under the current tort system
involving compensable birth-related injuries. If a significant
number of birth injuries do not enter the tort liability system but
would be compensated under these programs, then there could be
many more claims. The programs could be significantly more costly
if it is difficult to distinguish between injuries caused by birth-re-
lated accidents and injuries due to other causes such as congenital
birth defects or maternal drug abuse. 2
90. There is evidence that the Virginia program has relieved the crisis in malpractice
insurance coverage for obstetricians by removing the worst risks from the system. Note,
supra note 11, at 1499-1500. See infa note 99.
91. No claims have yet been presented to either the Virginia or the Florida funds
since the plans were enacted; thus, no information is yet available on the performance of
the programs. Telephone interview with Eleanor Pyles, Virginia Birth Related Injury
Compensation Fund, Richmond (Mar. 20, 1989); telephone interview with Carol Shir-
key, Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, Tallahassee
(Mar. 30, 1989).
92. Epstein criticizes the Virginia program's definition of the compensable event,
pointing out that "it is often difficult to distinguish serious injuries caused at or before
birth from those caused by birth defects." Epstein, supra note 33, at 1469. He speculates
that a mother's abuse of cocaine can cause severe fetal brain defects that might "not be





Virginia and Florida Birth Injury Compensation Plans 93
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VA: 600 @ $5,000





Other physicians $ 2,250,000
VA: 9,000 @ $250
FL: 20,000 @ $250
Participating hospitals
VA: 85,000 deliveries @ $50
FL: 170,000 deliveries @ $50
Insurance companies
VA: $4,250,000,000 @ 0.25 %
















As with any insurance system, moral hazard and adverse selection
threaten the financial feasibility of the no-fault plan .1 4 Moral hazard
affects both providers and families of the injured infants. In the ab-
sence of experience-rating (as in the Virginia and Florida plans),
providers know that injuries will be compensated and that there will
be no liability for malpractice, so they may allow more injuries to
occur. Families of injured patients who know that all costs are cov-
ered will lose any incentive to reduce the costs of treatment. Even
93. Sources of data in table:
Virginia: "HB 1216 Virginia Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act
Cost Estimates" (1987) (furnished to author by Sandra L. Kramer, attorney, Medical
Society of Virginia, Richmond) (based on actuarial study conducted by Tillinghast, Nel-
son & Warren, Inc., Atlanta, GA, and on reported premiums from Va. Bureau of Insur-
ance). See also D. Shepard, K. Pederson & C. Gallup, supra note 7, at 15-16.
Florida: Letter from Jerome F. Vogel, Actuary, Bureau of Rates, Fla. Dept. of Insur-
ance to Pamela Birch Fort, Staff Director, Fla. Senate Commerce Committee (Jan. 11,
1988).
94. See supra notes 34 and 85.
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before any accident occurs, families will be less likely to self-insure
against birth injuries (i.e., they might buy health insurance that ex-
cludes coverage of catastrophic health care connected with birth in-
juries for their dependents). Such reduction of collateral benefits
would increase the financial burden on the plan if an injury occurs.
If many more injured infants bring claims than currently bring
suit, such adverse selection would make the no-fault system much
more costly than the current malpractice tort system of compensa-
tion. Since about three-quarters of malpractice tort claims tried to
verdict and half of claims resolved out of court result in no liability
for defendants,9 5 the guaranteed compensation of the plan could
encourage many more meritorious claims to be brought. Also, in a
voluntary program with no mechanism for deterrence like Virginia's
and Florida's, less competent or more risky providers would be
more likely to opt into the plan, thus raising the costs.
IV Policy Recommendations
The defects of the Virginia and Florida plans can be cured by
combining some of the best features of the other systems to create
an alternative no-fault plan. First, the premiums or assessments lev-
ied on providers could be experience-rated, as proposed by Havig-
hurst and Tancredi. Experience-rated premiums give providers an
incentive to avoid birth injuries, since providers with higher than
average numbers of birth injuries would pay increased premiums.
However, to avoid giving doctors and hospitals an incentive to re-
fuse to handle risky deliveries, the experience-rated premiums
should be adjusted to take account of the riskiness of the provider's
practice. Because experience-rated premiums are based on cumula-
tive accident experience rather than determinations of liability in
specific cases, the providers themselves would have an incentive to
determine steps to reduce the incidence of birth injuries. There-
fore, there would be no need for wasteful defensive medicine, and
injury avoidance would be less costly and more efficient.
Experience-rating combined with a voluntary program could
cause adverse selection. Providers with higher than average acci-
dent experiences and consequently higher premiums might opt not
to participate in the no-fault program. The deterrent function of
experience-rating could be weakened if these providers opted in-
stead to take part in the tort and (non-experience-rated) malpractice
95. P. Danzon & L. Lillard, The Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims: Research




insurance system. This adverse selection effect could be mitigated if
the program were universal and compulsory for all providers,' t or if
once providers opt into the program they are not allowed to opt
out.
However, the departure of riskier providers from the program as
their assessments rise would have some beneficial effects. Through
the reverse of adverse selection, providers who opt to stay in the no-
fault program would tend to be those with the lowest accident expe-
rience. The incentives created by experience-rating would therefore
improve the financial stability of a voluntary program.
A second improvement to the no-fault program would be to
change the payment mechanism to provide more dependable fi-
nancing for the system. Obstetricians and hospitals, who would be
released from malpractice liability under a no-fault plan, should pay
all or most of its costs. 9 7 Such a plan should cause a reduction in
malpractice liability premiums because many malpractice risks
would be removed from the liability system."" Physicians and hospi-
tals theoretically should be willing to contribute an amount to this
plan that is up to one dollar less than the amount by which their
malpractice premiums would be reduced.
Third, a disciplinary deterrence mechanism like that in the admin-
istrative fault-based proposal should be adopted. The same admin-
istrative agency that decides whether compensation is paid could
also have the power to discipline providers. It could use its informa-
tion on adverse medical outcomes to initiate disciplinary action
against providers where warranted. Such an agency would essen-
tially serve as a strengthened and reconstituted board of medical
96. A commentator on the Virginia program has recommended that the plan be
amended to require mandatory participation for three reasons: (1) to ensure equal treat-
ment for all infants suffering birth injuries; (2) to make it easier to predict financing
requirements; and (3) to prevent opting out by physicians who inaccurately assess the
risks they face. Note, supra note 11, at 1514-16.
97. Providers pay only a small proportion of the cost of the Virginia and Florida
programs. See Table 2, supra text accompanying note 93, for a breakdown of the financ-
ing of those programs.
98. The Virginia Bureau of Insurance has required insurers to reduce malpractice
premiums of obstetricians who participate in the program by an actuarially reasonable
amount (generally 10% to 20%). Telephone interview with Robert Miller, Deputy Com-
missioner, Va. Bureau of Insurance, Richmond (Mar. 11, 1989). Florida may follow suit,
but has not yet done so. Telephone interview with Carol Shirkey, supra note 91. During
the legislative debate, two insurance companies had promised to end moratoria on new
malpractice insurance policies for obstetricians if the bill passed. Letter from Gordon D.
McLean, Executive Vice-President of Virginia Professional Underwriters, Inc., to Ronald
K. Davis, M.D., Virginia Surgical Associates (Jan. 13, 1987); Letter from Michael S. Mul-
len, President, Medical Protective Company, to Delegate Clifton A. Woodrum (Feb. 18,
1987).
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quality assurance for obstetricians. If necessary, the agency would
have sufficient medical information to adjust the statutory definition
of compensable events99 through generalized administrative
rulemaking or through decisions in particular cases and a gradual
"common law" process.
Fourth, the compensation could be provided in a way that would
control moral hazard. Moral hazard arises in any system that pro-
vides compensation for losses as they are incurred. In medical care,
families and caretakers of injured children lack an incentive to con-
trol expenses. This problem would be eliminated if compensation
were provided in kind, as comprehensive services through an agency
or other organization. An existing state agency serving the needs of
people with developmental disabilities, or private health mainte-
nance organizations under contract with the compensation fund
program, could pay for all the injured child's expenses. The same
agency could also collect the premiums and administer the funds. A
separate agency would determine whether claims should be paid,
discipline providers, and set standards of care.
Fifth, providers could be given an incentive to initiate the com-
pensation process in a no-fault system, as in the economic damage
offer system. Such an incentive to initiate the process could be simi-
lar to that provided in the economic damage offer proposal. Provid-
ers who knew of compensable birth-related injuries but failed to
report them could be liable for punitive damages (as in O'Connell's
proposal) or could be liable to pay a standard monetary penalty,
either to the injured patient or to the fund.
V. Conclusion
A no-fault administrative system for compensating infants with
birth-related injuries promises to provide fairer compensation, bet-
ter deterrence of injuries, and lower costs than the other systems
considered. Such a no-fault program, if properly designed, could be
a creative and powerful policy tool to solve the obstetric care availa-
bility crisis. The Virginia and Florida programs serve as instructive
models for other states in implementing a no-fault birth injury com-
pensation plan, although aspects of their systems should be altered.
99. The definition of the compensable event should be broadened by combining Vir-
ginia's and Florida's definitions by using Florida's broader definition of the level of disa-
bility but without the restriction to births of term gestation. See supra note 52.
Intentionally inflicted injuries should be compensable, but the fund should have the
right to sue the provider for subrogation, and coverage by the no-fault system should




Such systems for birth injuries could serve as models for addressing
medical malpractice generally. More research is needed to assess
the financial feasibility of a program such as that outlined here. This
information will be useful in creating a system that will provide
long-term compensation to injured infants and their families, deter
malpractice, and improve the availability of obstetric care.
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